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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

SHELLEY ANN TRIPP,
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Case No.
890425-CA
Case Priority 14.b

vs
LOWELL BRYCE TRIPP,
Defendant and
Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE
IN AND FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CIVIL NO. D88-865,
THE HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA, PRESIDING

SHELLEY ANN TRIPP
4511 White Flower Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84120

J. DOUGLAS KINATEDER
2040 East 4800 South
Suite 112
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117

Respondent Pro Se

Attorney for Appellant

July 11, 1990 '^ I : J990
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS:
I am writing this letter to let you know why I have not
filed a brief as stated in your letter to me dated July 5,
1990.
When I received your letter, I contacted Legal Aid
of Salt Lake, since it was through them that I received my
divorce. I was told with the full child support that I now
receive, that I was not eligible to go through them. I
then contacted several attorneys and was told what the
cost would be, and frankly, I can not afford that. I am
making$5.76 per hour, working 36-40 hours per week. I
also receive $350 per month for child support.
I felt I had to write and let you know how I felt about
this appeal. Mr Tripp, the defendant and appellant, was
told he could drop health coverage on the chiIdren since
my employment through FHP provided it. I pay $23.46 every
two weeks for that insurance (copy enclosed). There is no
charge for office visits, x-rays, lab work, or immunizations.
There is a $2.00 charge for prescriptions. There is also
a small charge for glasses and some of the dental work if it
is needed. From May 3, 1989 through Dec. 12, 1989, Mr Tripp
payed a total of $70 in back medical bills when the court
ordered him to. Since then, there is a total of $117 in
medical expenses, of which Mr Tripp owes \ of. I have never
received that money. I have not pursued court action on this
as I don't feel $58.50 is worth what it would cost me to take
him to court to collect.
I feel Mr Tripp should either take out full coverage
on the children or pay 507o of all non covered medical
expenses and possibly 507o of the amount of the medical
coverage that I now pay, as he is the father and should
help with his own children.
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The other item Mr Tripp is appealing is the tax
exemption of the children. As Mr Tripp is only paying
$116 per month per child, I don!t feel he is paying \ of
their expenses to be able tQc use one of the children as
an exemption. With 2 of the children being boys, they are
involved in the scouting, as well as sports. The other child,
a 13 year old girl, in Junior High School, with school
activities that require additional money that I pay.
I am paying this as well as their daily needs, such as
food, clothing, place to live with all the expense that
comes with that.
The court made a decision when this degree was granted.
And I have tried to follow it as closely as possible.
So, if the court feels it necessary to change the degree, I
will also follow the new ruling that you change if you see
fit to do so.
I don't know if this letter will h&lp my case, but
as I have stated at the beginning of this letter, I can
not support my children and also support the lawyers with
the little income I have coming in. But I do hope you will
take what I have stated into consideration in your decision.

Shelly Ann Tripp
4511 White Flower Way
West Valley City, Utah
967-597^

84120
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Attorney for Appellant
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
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In Re:
Shelley Ann Tripp,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
ease No. 890425-CA
Lowell Bryce Tripp,
Defendant and Appellant.
Dear Mr. Kinateder:
Enclosed is a copy of a letter received from the
appellee in the above appeal, which we note has not been
served on you.
I spoke with Mrs. Tripp to see if she intended to file
a brief and she indicated this letter is in lieu of her
brief.
Therefore, if you intend to file a reply brief, it is
due August 16th. If not, it is your responsibility to have
the trial court forward the record to this court. The case
will then be placed in the calendar pipeline to work its
way down to be scheduled for oral argument.

Janice Ray
Deputy Clerk
cc:

Shelley Tripp
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

SHELLEY ANN TRIPP,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs .

Case No.
890425-CA
Case Priority 14.b

LOWELL BRYCE TRIPP,
Defendant and
Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

I.
JURISDICTION AND NATU RE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is a divorce ac tion filed in the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah.

Defendant/appe llant appeals to this

Court pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2a -3(g) from a Decree of
Divorce entered on May 3, 1989 , by the Honorable James
S. Sawaya.

II,
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in signing

1

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, over the
objections of appellant, which Findings, Conclusions and Decree were beyond the award referred
to in the Court's Memorandum Opinion?
B.

Did the trial court err in not deciding

issues

raised at trial; namely, the tax exemptions to be
awarded to the parties.

The trial court did not

address the issue in its Memorandum Decision nor in
the Findings,

III .
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant/appellant requests the appellate
court to remand to the trial Court with

instructions

tO:

A.

Take additional evidence regarding the parties 1
ability to provide medical insurance for the
children pursuant to the needs of the children and
the ability of the parties to pay the same and for
the Court to determine this in supplementary
findings;

B.

Make a determination and findings regarding tax
exemptions as to children and their allocation to
the parties.
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IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a divorce action which was commenced
in March, of 1988.

Trial was held on February 28,

1989, before the Honorable James S.

Sawaya, who

rendered a Memorandum Decision on March 1, 1989.

From

a Decree entered on May 3, 1989, appellant/defendant
filed his Notice of Appeal on July 3, 1989.
After trial on the issues of the divorce, the
trial court issued a Memorandum Decision and requested
plaintiff's counsel to prepare Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.

The findings submitted added bene-

fits to plaintiff not referred to in the Memorandum
Decision, among which was the order that the defendant
pay one-half

(1/2) of all medical bills not covered by

plaintiff's insurance.

During the trial the evidence

had established that plaintiff and defendant were both
carrying insurance on the parties' children and the
court commented, and defendant through his counsel submitted, a solution; namely to the affect that instead
of paying premiums for superfluous insurance, the
defendant should increase his alimony to the plaintiff.
The Memorandum Decision reflected this conclusion of
the court, while the prepared findings added obliga-
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tions to the defendant, in addition to those specified
by the Memorandum Decision.

Appellant's counsel

objected to the prepared Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, and when no response to the
objection was filed in the time provided by the rules,
defendant's counsel submitted the matter in writing to
the court.

Plaintiff's counsel then submitted new

findings which contained the same objections to the
findings except those minor in nature.

The court,

however, signed the Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.

V.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court abused its discretion in signing
Findings and Decree which included an award to
plaintiff not referred to in the Court's Memorandum
Decision, but which was inserted by plaintiff's
counsel.

The Court also erred in not making a

determination as to the rights of the parties for tax
exemptions on the children.
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VI.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
THROUGH A DECREE OF DIVORCE WHICH ADDED
HEALTH INSURANCE BENEFITS TO THE WIFE NOT
SOUGHT AT TRIAL AND WHICH WERE NOT INCLUDED
IN THE COURT'S MEMORANDUM DECISION.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-5 (1),
states:
When a Decree of Divorce is rendered, the
court may include in it equitable orders
in it relating to the children, property,
and parties. The court shall include the
following in every Decree of Divorce: an
order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical
and dental expenses of the dependent children; and (b) if coverage is available at a
reasonable cost an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health,
hospital and dental care insurance for the
dependent children.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that because
the trial court has considerable latitude in fashioning
appropriate child support orders, the courts should not
disturb the actions of the trial court unless there has
been an abuse of discretion.

Proctor v. Proctor, 773,

1389, at 1390, (citing Woodward v. Woodward, 709, P.
2d, at 394; Jorgenson v. Jorgenson, 667, P. 2d, at 22.
In Proctor y. Proctor, the Supreme Court remanded to
the trial court because:

5

The final decree does not accurately reflect the trial judge's intentions, as
revealed in his oral ruling and the Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
(Proctor y^_
Proctor, 773 P. 2d, at 1390)
We do not know from the case as reported in
the Pacific Reporter what specifically the Findings and
oral comments of the trial court were; however, the
Utah Supreme Court did have the record before it and
determined that the Decree was adverse to the Findings
of the trial court in its oral contentions.

This is

similar to the instant case in that the Court had provided in its Memorandum Opinion that the defendant
would not be obligated to pay for the medical

insurance

of the children though he had previously done so.

The

Court in the instant case, however, did sign Findings
providing for payment of medical expenses which went
beyond the provisions of the Memorandum Opinion.

So

the instant case differs slightly from Proctor v.
Proctor, in that the Decree is adverse to the written
opinion, but not the Findings.
The Utah Supreme Court, in Bake y_^ B_akjs, 772
P. 2d, 461, reversed where Findings were inadequate.
In Bake v. Bake, the Court found that the
Findings did not support an award of child support.
This case moves us closer to the instant one.
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There

the court stated that had there been Findings, they
would be deferred to unless they were clearly
erroneous.

The Court then cites a criminal case of

1987, State v. Walker, 743 P. 2d, 191, 193, where, at
page 193, there is a discussion into the definition of
erroneous Findings.

The Court cites United States v.

IJnited States Gypsum C^. , 333 U.S. 364, 395:
A Finding is clearly erroneous when,
although there is evidence to support it,
the reviewing court on the entire evidence
is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Walker
states :
There, the content of Rule 52(a) is clearly
an erroneous standard imported from the Federal rule, requires that if the Findings (or
the trial court's verdict in a criminal case,) are
against the clear weight of the evidence,
or the appellate court otherwise reaches a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made, the Findings (or verdict) will
be set aside.
Appellant argues that the Findings were
clearly erroneous because the Court and the parties
intended to have alimony raised in lieu of the
insurance coverage provided by the defendant.
trial court on the third page of its Memorandum
Decision

(Record at No.79) stated:

Plaintiff is employed by FHP and is provided medical and hospital insurance by
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The

them for her benefit and the benefit of
the children, consequently she is ordered
to continue that coverage until further
order of the court, and defendant is
obligated to provide no medical or
dental insurance for the benefit of the
children.
Nonetheless, plaintiff's counsel inserted one
additional sentence in the Findings of Fact, which went
far beyond the Court's Memorandum Decision,

In the

Findings submitted to counsel on or about March 24,
1989, was inserted the additional sentence:
Both parties should be ordered to pay
one-half of all non-covered and deductible medical and dental expenses for
the benefit of the minor children.
This additional sentence was objected to by counsel for
the defendant and when no response was received from
plaintiff's counsel, the matter was submitted for
decision.

Plaintiff's counsel immediately

other objections made to the Findings

corrected

(the insertion of

a legal description omitted), but refused to omit the
offending language pertaining to additional medical
coverage.

The Honorable James S. Sawaya signed the

revised Findings without further testimony or hearing.
Immediately after receipt of the Memorandum
Decision of the Court, appellant/defendant dropped his
coverage for the children and began paying
alimony.

additional

The plaintiff, however, began submitting
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additional medical bills to the defendant for any item
which could be construed as a medical expense.
Defendant could not pay for these, mainly because he
had dropped the additional insurance, and was also
paying the additional alimony.
From the transcript it is clear that one of
the conditions of the plaintiff's employment with FHP
was that she use the coverage provided by the company
and the services with FHP exclusively.
The defendant testified that after a pretrial hearing he was ordered to obtain health
for the three children and did so.

insurance

(T. p. 103)

Later, according to his testimony, the plaintiff/wife
informed him that she had received employment through
FHP and did not need the insurance, though the insurance would provide secondary coverage.
Q

And do you recall a discussion at one
of the pre-trial hearings where she said
she had to use FHP?

A

[Defendant]

Q

And if she uses FHP, what if any good
does this insurance do for your children?

A

It would only cover a secondary — if FHP
does not cover it, they could resubmit
it through Alta Health Strategies.

Q

Would you be willing to increase your
child support if the Court gave you
permission despite the request of the

Yes.
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joined party today to drop that extra
health insurance for your children?
A

If so ordered, I would drop the health
insurance and increase the child support,
but there's no way I can increase the
child support and do the health insurance at the same time.
(T. p. 104)
It is clear also that the Court was aware of

the FHP coverage and the coverage of the defendant and
thought both were superfluous.
THE COURT: These kids are covered by FHP
at your employment?
They are also covered
by your employment.
Is there any need for
two coverages?
(T. p. 104-105)
It is clear that the counsel for the plaintiff contemplated the increase of alimony by the
dropping of the health insurance.
MR. GREGAN:
I have made a computation
that shows that approximately $60 a
month in child support would be the
effect of dropping the insurance. His
child support under the guidelines
should be increased by that.
(T. p. 105)
The only conclusion one could draw from the
testimony in the transcript is that there was to be an
increase in alimony with the dropping of defendant's
insurance on the children.

This is no benefit to him;

however, if every conceivable medical expense

incurred

by the plaintiff must be submitted to the husband for
50% reimbursement.

He would have been better off to

carry the secondary medical insurance.
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The Court made

no comment whatsoever regarding reimbursement to plaintiff in its Memorandum Decision and the Finding is
clearly a mistake.

Had the trial Court found from the

evidence that the defendant had the means to pay for
additional reimbursement to plaintiff for all medical
and dental expenses incurred for the children, his
Findings should have explained why the Court was making
a clear departure from its recommendations in the Memorandum Decision and why the additional award was
justified.

In Jensen v. Jensen, 275 P. 2d, 436, the

Utah Supreme Court reversed where the trial Court made
insufficient Findings to justify additional relief to
one of the parties where neither the Court's comments
from the bench nor its initial order explained its
reasoning in providing the relief.

Therefore, a

reversal is required and either additional

evidence

should be taken on the issue or additional Findings
made by the Court to justify the relief which went
beyond the Memorandum Decision.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECIDING ISSUES
RAISED AT TRIAL; NAMELY, THE TAX EXEMPTIONS
TO BE AWARDED TO THE PARTIES. THE TRIAL COURT
DID NOT ADDRESS THE ISSUE IN ITS MEMORANDUM
DECISION NOR IN THE FINDINGS.
The trial Court failed to make a determin-
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ation regarding the award of tax exemptions to the
parties pursuant to the needs of the children and the
degree of support provided by the parties.

The Court

has held in J^efferies v_^ .Jefferies, 752 P. 2d, 909,
911, that the trial Court must enter Findings of Fact
on all relevant issues.

The Court should, therefore,

remand to the trial Court requesting Findings of Fact
based on the evidence before the Court which will make
a determination to the benefit of the parties.

CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, because of the clearly

erroneous

Findings and the necessity of determining the parties 1
rights as to tax exemptions, counsel for appellant
respectfully requests a remand to the trial Court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / /

day of

April, 1990.

J. DOdGLAS KINATEDER
Attorney for Defendant/
Appellant
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IN THE COURT OF

APPEALS

IN AND FOR THE STATE OF

S H E L L E Y ANN

TRIPP,

UTAH

i
CERTIFICATE OF
FILING AND SERVICE

P l a i n t i f f and
Respondent,

Case No.
890425-CA
Case Priority 14.b

vs .
L O W E L L BRYCE

TRIPP,

D e f e n d a n t and
Appellant.
•

J. DOUGLAS KINATEDER, Attorney for Defendant/
Appellant, Lowell Bryce Tripp, hereby certifies that on
the 19th day of April, 1990, the original and seven
copies of the Brief of Appellant were filed with the
Clerk of the Court of Appeals and that a true and
correct copy of the Brief of Appellant were mailed,
postage prepaid, to plaintiff, Shelley Ann Tripp, at
4511 S. White Flower Way, West Valley City, Utah 84120
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of

April, 1990.

J. DOUGLAS KINATEDER
Attorney for Defendant/
Appellant
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